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Bank lending to households and businesses over the past several years was aﬀected substantially
by the turmoil that raged in the global ﬁnancial markets during the 2007–09 period. The successive
waves of turbulence that ripped through the ﬁnancial system during that period—especially the
intensiﬁcation of stresses that followed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in the early autumn of
2008—exerted substantial pressure on both the asset and liability sides of banks’ balance sheets.
During the height of the crisis in the latter part of 2008, banks faced funding markets that were
largely illiquid and secondary markets that were essentially closed to sales of certain types of
loans and securities. Together with the slowdown in economic activity that set in at the end of
2007 and accelerated appreciably in late 2008, these ﬁnancial disruptions caused banks to become
signiﬁcantly more cautious in the extension of credit and to take steps to bolster their capital and
liquidity positions.
Throughout this period of ﬁnancial market turmoil, policymakers were greatly concerned about
the availability of bank-intermediated credit to both households and businesses, as large reductions
in the supply of bank loans had the potential to exacerbate the ongoing contraction in spending
and production.1 In addition to the usual problem of trying to disentangle the eﬀects on bank
lending of supply versus demand, the ability to measure the provision of credit by banks was
greatly complicated by the lack of suﬃcient data on credit ﬂows through the banking sector. In
particular, the most widely used and comprehensive U.S. data sources on banks’ lending activities
provide detailed information only on the stock of loans on banks’ books at the end of the reporting
period, along, in some instances, with the cumulative year-to-date amounts charged oﬀ.2
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1Empirical studies documenting the real-side eﬀects of adverse shocks to bank loan supply include, among oth-
ers, Bernanke and Lown [1991], Peek and Rosengren [1997, 2000], Calomiris and Mason [2003], Ashcraft [2005],
Lown and Morgan [2006], and Bassett et al. [2010]. Gilchrist and Zakrajˇ sek [2011b,c], in contrast, employ secondary
market prices on individual corporate bond issues to derive a broader measure of disruptions in the credit intermedi-
ation process—the so-called excess bond premium—and show that their measure of ﬁnancial distress has signiﬁcant
eﬀects on economic activity and asset prices; Gilchrist and Zakrajˇ sek [2011a] show that shocks to the excess bond
premium have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on bank lending.
2By far the most comprehensive publicly-available data on bank lending come from the quarterly Consolidated
1Importantly, changes in the outstanding stock of bank loans are a very noisy signal of banks’
underlying loan origination activity, because such changes also capture other intermediation ac-
tivities, including loan purchases, loan sales, and securitizations. Indeed, there is virtually no
information available on the ﬂow of loan originations, or factors other than charge-oﬀs that aﬀect
the amount of outstanding loans. Moreover, because the banking system provides credit to house-
holds and businesses in two important ways—by originating new loans (on balance sheet) and by
providing lines of credit (oﬀ balance sheet)—information on drawdowns, credit line expirations, and
bank- or borrower-induced reductions or cancellations of credit lines is also crucial to any eﬀort
that attempts to monitor banks’ lending capacity during a cyclical downturn. The existing data
sources, however, provide only limited information on the stock of banks’ oﬀ-balance-sheet—that
is, unused—commitments to fund loans.
In this chapter, we highlight some of the diﬃculties that arise in measuring accurately the
provision of credit by the banking sector during an economic downturn, such as the one experienced
during the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Speciﬁcally, we argue that existing bank regulatory reports provide
insuﬃcient detail to monitor banks’ lending activities accurately.3 We then outline a conceptual
framework for measuring bank lending that could be used to improve the existing information on
banks’ on-balance-sheet lending activities and the equally-important information on banks’ oﬀ-
balance-sheet credit line provision activities. The improved data would help address the following
questions of concern to both economic researchers and policymakers, questions that cannot be
readily answered with the existing data sources:
• Are banks making loans? If so, how much and to whom are they lending?
• Can the broad research community provide timely quantitative analysis about the relative
contributions of the supply of, and demand for, credit that drive changes in banks’ outstanding
loan balances and unused commitments to fund loans?
Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports), which are submitted by insured U.S. commercial banks and by U.S.
branches and agencies of foreign banks to the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). The Call
Reports collect information on outstanding loan balances for a wide variety of loan categories, along with the ﬂow
of gross charge-oﬀs and recoveries. The Call Reports do contain some information on loan originations and on the
amount of loans purchased, but this information is limited to a few narrow loan categories, is available over a limited
period of time, and is insuﬃcient to track accurately the ﬂow of credit through the banking sector. The Federal
Reserve’s weekly H.8 Statistical Release, “Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United States,” provides
an estimated aggregate balance sheet for all commercial banks in the United States; the release also includes separate
balance sheet aggregations for several bank-size groups. Based on items that are derived from the Call Reports,
the H.8 release includes only the amount of loans outstanding for the major categories of loans to households and
businesses—it does not, for example, include data on charge-oﬀs. Similarly, the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United
States, which are also based largely on Call Reports, include information on the aggregate amount of bank loans
outstanding at quarter-end for the major categories of loans to households and businesses.
3The existing data sources also made it diﬃcult to assess the eﬀectiveness of certain policies implemented
by government agencies during the recent ﬁnancial crisis; see, for example, testimony of Paul Atkins, Member,
Congressional Oversight Panel, before the House Financial Services Committee on May 18, 2010, available at
http://www.house.gov.apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/atkins_5-18-10.pdf.
2• What adjustments to credit provision are banking organizations making in response to the
enhanced regulatory capital and liquidity requirements that are pending as a result of the
Dodd-Frank Act and the Basel III agreement?
We recognize that the literal adoption of our framework would increase banks’ reporting burden.
Our aim, rather, is to provide a detailed description of the kind of data that would signiﬁcantly
inform the analysis of credit ﬂows and greatly enhance our ability to assess the availability of bank-
intermediated credit. In practice, of course, discussions among all the members of the FFIEC,
consideration of how the proposed new data items are stored in banks’ reporting systems—if they
are stored at all—and the costs associated with reporting new items on a regular basis would have
to be carefully weighed to ensure that the marginal beneﬁts of the additional information exceeded
the associated reporting burden.
Bank Lending During the 2007–09 Financial Crisis
To help frame our discussion, we use the quarterly Flow of Funds Accounts to examine the cyclical
dynamics of bank lending to households and businesses, with a particular aim of providing some
historical context for the 2007–09 ﬁnancial crisis. We consider the following four major categories
of bank loans: home mortgages, commercial mortgages, consumer credit (i.e., credit card, auto,
and other consumer loans), and nonﬁnancial business credit (i.e., commercial and industrial (C&I)
loans extended to nonﬁnancial businesses).
We ﬁrst converted each category of nominal loans outstanding to real terms by deﬂating it
with the GDP price deﬂator. Because our focus is on cyclical ﬂuctuations in bank lending, we
detrended the resulting series by regressing the logarithm of each real loan aggregate on a constant
and linear and quadratic time trends over the 1952:Q1–2010:Q4 period. For each NBER-dated
recession since 1952, we normalized the detrended series to equal zero at its respective business
cycle peak. The solid black line in each panel of Figure 1 depicts the average behavior of each bank
loan category around NBER-dated business cycle peaks, calculated using data for all recessions
since 1953 (excluding the 2007–09 downturn), while the shaded band represents the corresponding
range of outcomes. The red line in each panel shows the behavior of each series during the 2007–09
ﬁnancial crisis.
As shown in the top left panel, the collapse in housing market activity and a widespread drop
in home prices—two distinct features of the 2007–09 downturn—have left a signiﬁcant imprint on
home mortgage lending by commercial banks. Over the three years following the business cycle peak
in 2007:Q4, (real) home mortgage debt on banks’ books has fallen almost 30 percent relative to its
trend growth, and the runoﬀ in this loan category shows no sign of abating. The remaining three
major loan categories, in contrast, share a similar, though noticeably diﬀerent, pattern. Bank credit
extended to consumers and bank loans to businesses (both C&I and loans secured by commercial
3Figure 1: Cyclical Dynamics of Household and Business Lending at Commercial Banks
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Note: The panels of the ﬁgure depict the behavior of the major categories of loans to households and
nonﬁnancial businesses around NBER-dated business cycle peaks. Each category of loans outstanding is
deﬂated by the GDP price deﬂator (2005 = 100). The logarithm of each real loan aggregate was detrended
using linear and quadratic time trends. For each loan category, the average cyclical component (the black
lines) and the range of cyclical components (the shaded bands) are based on data for recessions designated
by the NBER since 1953, excluding the 2007–09 downturn.
Source: Authors’ calculations using U.S. Flow of Funds data.
4real estate) increased relative to trend in the early stages of the 2007–09 recession, peaking at the
end of 2008, around the time of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. A large part of this surge
in lending to businesses and households undoubtedly reﬂects loans that were drawn down under
previous commitments, though the magnitude of this important eﬀect cannot be ascertained with
the existing data sources.4
The emergence of the destructive feedback loop between the turmoil in ﬁnancial markets and
the downturn in economic activity sparked by the collapse of Lehman exerted substantial pressure
on both sides of banks’ balance sheets. As a result, banks became signiﬁcantly more cautious in the
extension of credit, saw massive losses deplete capital, and relied more on the Federal Reserve—and
less on the market—as a source of funding. Starting in late 2008, these factors, in combination
with the reduced demand for credit, caused a signiﬁcant contraction in commercial mortgages,
consumer credit, and C&I loans on banks’ books. Indeed, the run-oﬀ in both types of business loans
outstanding during the 2007–09 recession was considerably more severe and persistent compared
with an average post-war recession.5
The fact that changes in bank loans outstanding—especially of C&I loans—are typically a
lagging business cycle indicator reﬂects importantly the banks’ unique role as a provider of credit
in the form credit lines. According to the top panel of Figure 2, the dollar amount of unused
commitments to fund loans to households and businesses—that is, core unused commitments—has,
on average, exceeded the amount of core loans outstanding by a signiﬁcant margin over the past
two decades.6 As shown in the bottom panel, credit card commitments account for the majority of
this oﬀ-balance-sheet exposure, followed closely by business credit lines.7
Another distinct feature of the 2007–09 economic downturn is the fact that core unused commit-
ments contracted much earlier and by a substantially greater amount than core loans outstanding
on banks’ books. A portion of this decline, of course, reﬂects drawdowns on the existing lines by
households and businesses, which mechanically boosts the amount of loans outstanding. A signif-
icant portion, however, also represents a reduction in the supply of bank credit lines, as banks,
in response to capital and liquidity pressures, reduced their oﬀ-balance-sheet credit exposures by
reducing their customers’ existing lines of credit.
Given the relative importance of banks’ commitments to fund loans, we can deﬁne a broader
measure of credit intermediation by commercial banks: core lending capacity, which attempts to
4Ivashina and Scharfstein [2010] provide detailed corroborative evidence of this phenomenon using Reuters’
DealScan database on syndicated lending. Unlike Call Reports, DealScan contains data on new loan originations,
though the scope of the data is limited to large syndicated business loans, and the data fall well short of providing a
comprehensive picture of banks’ credit intermediation activities.
5Although our analysis is focused on the commercial banking sector, we note that the general cyclical patterns of
these four loan categories at banks are very similar to those at all depository institutions.
6These data were added to Call Reports in 1990:Q2.
7It is important to note that what we label as “business lines” is recorded in Call Reports prior to 2010 as “other”
unused commitments. More detailed data available since 2010 suggest that credit lines to businesses—both ﬁnancial
and nonﬁnancial—account for the vast majority of this category, which indicates that these data provide a useful
proxy for unused credit lines to businesses.
5Figure 2: Core Loans and Unused Commitments at Commercial Banks
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(b) Composition of Unused Commitments
Note: The black line in the top panel depicts the dollar amount of core unused commitments, and the
dotted red line depicts the dollar amount of core loans outstanding at U.S. commercial banks. Core loan
categories include C&I, real estate, and consumer loans. The bottom panel depicts the composition of
unused commitments. All series are deﬂated by the GDP price deﬂator (2005 = 100). Shaded vertical bars
represent NBER-dated recessions.
Source: Call Reports.
capture the full potential of households and businesses to borrow from the banking sector over time,
as measured by the sum of core loans outstanding (i.e., loans already extended) and corresponding
commitments to fund such loans (i.e., promised extensions). The black line in Figure 3 depicts
the (annualized) quarterly growth rate of core lending capacity, while the shaded portions of the
vertical bars represent the quarterly growth contributions of core loans outstanding and core unused
commitments.
According to the ﬁgure, cyclical ﬂuctuations in core lending capacity are driven importantly by
changes in unused commitments, a pattern that was especially pronounced during the most recent
crisis. Although the available data cover only the past three recessions, the dynamics in Figure 3
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Note: The black line depicts the seasonally-adjusted (annualized) quarterly growth rate of core lending
capacity at U.S. commercial banks; core lending capacity is deﬁned as the sum of core loans outstanding
and corresponding unused commitments. All series are deﬂated by the GDP price deﬂator (2005 = 100).
Shaded vertical bars represent NBER-dated recessions.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Call Report data.
indicate that changes in unused commitments are likely to provide a more timely signal regarding
cyclical changes in credit availability, compared with changes in loans outstanding.
Information Needed to Measure Credit Flows
The analysis presented above highlights the inherent limitations faced by researchers and policy-
makers when assessing the availability of bank-intermediated credit during a cyclical downturn
based on changes in outstanding loans and commitments. In particular, to help distinguish the
relative contributions of supply and demand factors in driving changes in outstanding balances
held on banks’ books, considerably more detailed information about banks’ lending and credit line
provision activities would need to be collected. This information falls into the following four broad
categories: (1) credit extended under commitment vs. credit extended not under commitment;
(2) credit provided to new customers vs. credit provided to existing customers;8 (3) changes in
8By banks’ new customers, we mean those that currently have no loans outstanding with a particular institution—
that is, the bank currently has no credit exposure to that customer. If, as we argue later, data on new loan originations
7credit ﬂows owing to decisions by the bank vs. changes in credit ﬂows owing to decisions by the
borrower; and (4) purchases and sales of credit products by the bank.
Separating loan originations made under commitment from originations not made under com-
mitment, and more accurately measuring lending to new customers compared with existing cus-
tomers, would likely yield signiﬁcant insights into the relative contributions of supply and demand
factors to lending ﬂows. Because loans not extended under previous commitment typically embody
the most recent lending standards and terms being applied by the bank, an expansion or contraction
in such loans should be indicative of both current supply and demand conditions.9 Likewise, newly
established credit lines, or increases in existing credit lines, also reﬂect the conﬂuence of supply
and demand as embodied in the current economic landscape. In contrast, loans drawn down under
previous commitment largely reﬂect lending policies that prevailed at the time the agreement was
reached. As a result, changes in outstanding loan balances under existing credit lines may be most
indicative of the demand for credit from ﬁrms with such credit lines.
The sources of loan growth—whether under commitment or not under commitment and whether
from existing customers or new customers—can also contain important information for monitoring
ﬁnancial stability and can, therefore, inform macroprudential regulatory policies and responses (cf.
Schularick and Taylor [2010]). Growth in loans outstanding that is driven primarily by existing
customers drawing down funds under standing lending commitments can be a sign of stress in
credit markets and a signal that loan supply eﬀects may be exerting a drag on economic growth.
In contrast, strong growth in credit extended to new customers could signal an increase in demand
for credit—and hence a pickup in economic activity—or it could suggest that banks have eased
their lending standards.10 The extent to which a step-up in credit growth is accounted for by
increased lending to existing customers—whose risks are better known to the bank—or lending to
new customers could provide supervisory authorities with potentially useful information regarding
the safety and soundness of individual banking institutions.
In order to fully decompose lending ﬂows, it is not only necessary to track credit extensions,
but also credit that has been extinguished—for example, because it has been paid down or oﬀ,
or because credit lines were reduced or cancelled, either at the request of the borrower or by the
bank. In addition, information on purchases and sales of loans would greatly improve the ability
of researchers and policymakers to better understand the creation of credit by the banking sector,
as well as help monitor the buildup of risk and the web of interconnectedness among banks and
nonbank ﬁnancial intermediaries. As demonstrated by the recent ﬁnancial crisis, a number of
were to be collected by expanding the existing Call Report schedules, the “new customer” concept would be assessed
at the bank level and not at the holding company level.
9Indeed, as shown by Morgan [1998], changes in loans outstanding not made under commitment are more sensitive
to changes in the stance of monetary policy than changes in loans made under commitment.
10For example, Keeton [1999] and Igan and Pinheiro [2010] present evidence showing that rapid loan growth leads
to higher-than-average subsequent losses. This result is consistent with the notion that rapid loan growth at an
institution—relative to its peer group—is an indication that such an institution may have eased lending standards
and terms, perhaps by more than is warranted by prevailing economic conditions.
8ﬁnancial institutions purchased or sold certain types of loans without properly vetting borrowers
or securing the appropriate documentation, a practice that contributed importantly to ﬁnancial
instability during the 2007–09 period (cf. Shin [2009]). Detailed data on purchases and sales of
loans would allow supervisory authorities to monitor changes in the volumes of such transactions
by particular institutions and help identify institutions with greater interconnectedness in those
markets; such data would also facilitate rigorous analysis of the potential costs and beneﬁts of
those operations, which could enhance eﬃciency of rule-making in this area.11
To measure accurately the provision of underlying credit over time, a substantial upgrade to
currently available information would be required. Speciﬁcally, letting L(t) denote the amount of
loans outstanding at the end of a reporting period t, equation (1) describes the possible ways that
loans outstanding can change between periods t − 1 and t:
L(t) = L(t − 1) − M(t) − P1(t) − P2(t) − S(t) − W(t)
+ E1(t) + E2(t) + D(t) + N1(t) + N2(t) + A(t),
(1)
where
• M(t) = loans (or portions of loans) that matured and were not rolled over or extended during
period t;
• P1(t) = loans (or portions of loans) paid oﬀ in advance of maturity during period t;
• P2(t) = loans (or portions of loans) paid oﬀ at maturity during period t;
• S(t) = loans sold or securitized, with or without further obligation during period t;12
• W(t) = loans charged oﬀ during period t;
• E1(t) = unpaid loans (or portions of loans) that matured and were rolled over or extended
during period t;
• E2(t) = unpaid loans (or portions of loans) that became newly past due;
• D(t) = amount of previously existing loan commitments newly drawn during period t;
11Detailed data on purchases of loans would serve an additional practical purpose. In the National Information
Center (NIC) database—a central repository of data about banks and other institutions for which the Federal Reserve
has a supervisory, regulatory, or research interest—a bank can purchase up to 95 percent of the assets of another
institution before the transaction is recorded as a merger. When a transfer of assets involving less than 95 percent of
the assets of the institutions occurs, it is recorded in the NIC database, but no information is recorded on the type
or amount of assets acquired; and when less than 40 percent of an institution transfers ownership, no entry is made
in the NIC database at all. The lack of data on these types of transactions results in substantial outliers when using
changes in loans outstanding to analyze credit growth.
12Further obligation includes the retention of servicing rights, recourse obligations, or other ongoing credit or
liquidity enhancements.
9• N1(t) = draws on new loan commitments that were ﬁnalized during period t;
• N2(t) = new loans that were not made under commitment during period t;
• A(t) = loans that were purchased or otherwise acquired during period t.
Of these items, only loans outstanding (L(t)) and loans charged oﬀ (W(t)) are systematically
collected on Call Reports.
As discussed above, accurate monitoring of banks’ capacity for credit intermediation over time
requires a similar decomposition for unused commitments to fund loans. Speciﬁcally, letting LC(t)
denote the amount of unused commitments outstanding at the end of the reporting period t,
equation (2) describes the evolution of this important oﬀ-balance-sheet item over time:
LC(t) = LC(t − 1) − MC1(t) − MC2(t) − MC3(t) − SC(t) − D(t)
+ EC(t) + NC(t) + AC(t),
(2)
where
• MC1(t) = unused loan commitments that expired or matured during period t;
• MC2(t) = unused loan commitments reduced or canceled by the bank in advance of
maturity during period t;
• MC3(t) = unused loan commitments reduced or canceled by the customer in advance of
maturity during period t;
• SC(t) = unused loan commitments sold or securitized during period t;
• D(t) = amount of previously existing loan commitments newly drawn during period t
(same as in equation (1);
• EC(t) = extensions of expired or matured unused loan commitments during period t;
• NC(t) = unused portion of new loan commitments ﬁnalized during period t
(i.e., new commitments during period t net of draws on those commitments);
• AC(t) = unused loan commitments purchased or otherwise acquired during period t.
Again, of the above items, only the amount of unused commitments (LC(t)) is systematically
collected on Call Reports.
From an operational perspective, the expansion of the FFIEC reporting forms 031, 041, and
002—the reporting forms that underlie the existing Call Report data for commercial banks—would
provide the most natural way to collect quarterly information on the full scope of banks’ lending
10activities.13 The loan categories for which these data would ideally be collected would include, at
a minimum, all of the major categories of lending to businesses and households that are currently
being monitored via Call Reports. Data on the full spectrum of loan categories is desirable because,
as discussed above and as evident from existing Call Report data, loan categories can behave quite
diﬀerently over time, as conditions in relevant sectors of the economy and of various borrowers
diﬀer widely at times.
The pronounced and prolonged contraction in business loans on banks’ books over the past
severel years has also underscored the limited ability of researchers and policymakers to assess and
analyze the availability of credit for small businesses, which are an important engine of economic
growth.14 In order to provide a window into the functioning of this important market, it would be
most useful to obtain business loan originations (both C&I and commercial real estate) by the size
of borrower. Speciﬁcally, the new data items listed above, in combination with the existing Call
Report schedules for outstanding loan balances and credit quality, could be disaggregated by ﬁrm
size, using either the number of employees or revenues as the size criterion.15 And lastly, it would
be most desirable to collect all of this information from other depository institutions as well (e.g.,
savings banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions), in order to obtain a comprehensive
overview of credit intermediation in the U.S. economy.
Conclusion
The recent ﬁnancial crisis and its aftermath has highlighted the limited ability of policymakers
and researchers to track and monitor accurately the provision of credit by the commercial banking
sector. The data currently available are inadequate to monitor and analyze credit ﬂows for the
most important categories of lending to both businesses and households. This chapter outlined
the type of data that would be needed to provide a more complete picture of banks’ lending and
credit line provision activities, information that would signiﬁcantly improve our understanding of
the credit intermediation process.
Even if such data were available, any analysis of the behavior of credit ﬂows over the course of
13For consistency with the loan schedules in the Call Reports, each new ﬂow item could be reported as the portion
of the outstanding stock of loans on the Call Report date that owed to the given activity over the quarter that ended
on the Call Report date. To reduce the reporting burden, an asset-based size test could possibly be used to exempt
the smallest banks from having to report the additional items.
14See the Federal Reserve Board’s Report to the Congress on the Avaliability of Credit to Small Businesses, available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/smallbusinesscredit/sbfreport2007.pdf.
15Small businesses are often classiﬁed as such on the basis of the number of employees, though there is no universally
accepted employee threshold that deﬁnes a small business. For example, the U.S. Small Business Administration’s
Oﬃce of Advocacy deﬁnes a small business as “an independent business having fewer than 500 employees.” The
Congress, in contrast, has in past legislation frequently deﬁned small businesses as those that have no more than
50 employees. Institutions that lend to small businesses, however, are more likely to collect—for underwritting
purposes—information on ﬁrms’ revenues. As a result, a deﬁnition of a small business based on the ﬁrm’s revenues
may be more appropriate when collecting information on small business lending from banking institutions.
11a business cycle is complicated by the fact that lending dynamics are determined by ﬂuctuations in
both the demand for and the supply of credit. While the proposed new data items would be helpful
in disentangling the relative importance of demand and supply factors, fundamental identiﬁcation
problems are likely to remain. Accordingly, collecting information on borrower characteristics—for
example, their income and balance sheet information—along with a more detailed and systematic
information on lending standards and loan terms would also likely provide considerable insights
regarding the role of bank-intermediated credit in the macroeconomy.
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